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Moral norms, moral ideals  
and supererogation
The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic 
moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. 
The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories 
are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral 
acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship 
within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance 
here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ide-
als (or in a wider aspect — laudable acts) and a thesis about their 
complementary character. For it seems that the omission of one of 
the elements that are analysed within a moral system must result 
in an essential limitation of both the possibilities of finding an ad-
equate approach to a given moral problem (on a descriptive level), 
as well as defining the full set of normative guidelines. Therefore, 
as I shall argue, resigning from a two-level method of moral analy-
sis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. 
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Moral norms as regulative orders
The notion of a moral norm
Verging on being a truism is the statement that the notion of 
a moral norm, which seems to be one of the key issues of philo-
sophical ethics, is an incredibly ambiguous and indeterminate no-
tion. Some authors use it to designate various predicates, and even 
related understandings of the notions are quite often characterised 
by significant differences in defining the details of the content. 
Moreover, one can also come across the replacement of this notion 
with several synonyms (“moral rule,” “moral principle” and in some 
cases “moral pattern.”1)
Two basic meanings of this notion might be pointed out here. On 
the one hand, the notion defines a basic ethics principle on which 
a certain axiological system2 is built. On the other hand, orders 
and prohibition directives of definite conduct are described by this 
term. A moral norm understood in this way will be the subject of 
the following consideration. 
In dictionaries of terms used in philosophy and ethics, this no-
tion is defined, for example, in the following way: “MORAL NORMS 
(Latin norm — rule; moralis — concerning customs) — regulations, 
imperatives describing a way of conduct which is appropriate in 
moral respect (good or right). Formulated in various grammatical 
form, most often in the shape of imperatives (e.g. ‘You shall not 
1 This notion is used by Richard B r a n d t  in: Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative 
and Critical Ethics. Prentice Hall, 1959. [Polish edition: R. B r a n d t: Etyka. Zagadnienia 
etyki normatywnej i metaetyki. Trans. B. S t a n o s z. Warszawa, 1996]. The concept of this 
author will be discussed in more depth in a further part of this paper; however, one must 
emphasise here that although this notion is used by Brandt in an unclear way and although it 
is rather associated with the sphere of moral ideals, it can be understood as the a of describ-
ing a moral norm.
2 See T. B i e s a g a  SD: Spór o normę moralną. Kraków, 1998. It seems that the notion 
of a “morality norm” as used in the work’s title has got a slightly different meaning from 
a “moral norm,” which is discussed in this paper, and this seems to render the differences in 
the meanings in the descriptions of these two norms well.
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commit adultery!’) or sentences including specific words ‘should’, 
‘ought to’, ‘has to’, ‘is obliged’ (e.g. ‘a doctor is obliged to respect pa-
tient’s convictions)’.”3 However, the most general definition is given 
by Zygmunt Ziembiński: “[…] norms — […] utterances which are 
formulated in a given language to express demand so that a person 
or people behaves in a definite way.”4
A moral norm may be generally described as a directive for act-
ing, an order for a definite type of conduct or a restraint from per-
forming definite actions. Such a directive refers to moral rights, 
and thus unwritten ones (in contrast with legal norms5), although 
it disposes of some kind of sanction. 
However, it is important to note the fact that such an approach 
to a moral norm is too general, because a moral norm also comprises 
those directives that are combined with a kind of higher obligation 
that determines some moral ideal. Therefore, it seems that to set 
the bounds of the notion precisely, a kind of duty and universality 
needs to be taken into account. In this way, a moral norm would 
3 E. K l i m o w i c z: “Normy moralne.” In: Słownik pojęć filozoficznych. Ed.: W. K r a j e w -
s k i. Warszawa, 1996, p. 138. A similar definition is given by Antoni Podsiad: “The norm […] 
1. et. Sometimes this notion is used for signifying all moral rules, including estimations […], 
that is, evaluating sentences. The norm in its wider meaning is not only an order or prohibi-
tion or the rule of conduct but also what this order, prohibition or rule justifies […].” (A. P o d -
s i a d: Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych. Warszawa, 2000, column 570. An identical 
definition appears in Mały słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych dla studiujących filozofię 
chrzeœcijańską. Ed.: A. P o d s i a d, Z. W i ę c k o w s k i. Warszawa, 1983. As a kind of curiosity, 
one may notice that the definition of such a fundamental term is not given, among others, by: 
Encyklopedia filozofii. Vols. 1—2. Ed. T. H o n d e r i c h. Trans. J. Ł o z i ń s k i. Poznań, 1998 
and 1999; W. P a ł u b i c k i: Antropologia­filozofia­etyka. Słownik podstawowych terminów 
i znaczeń. Gdańsk—Koszalin, 1998.
Ewa Klimowicz derives the etymology of the word “norm” in the quoted definition from the 
Latin term “rule” while, e.g., Czesław Z n a m i e r o w s k i  gives (Oceny i normy. Warszawa, 
1957, p. 265) the term “steel-square” as the Latin etymology, meaning a “device for check-
ing some properties (position of lines and surface)” As the term “rule” is endowed with quite 
a wide range of meanings in Polish, I will use Znamierowski’s definition in any instance of 
referring to the etymology of the word “norm.”
4 Z. Z i e m b i ń s k i: Etyczne problemy prawoznawstwa. Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków—
Gdańsk, 1972, p. 35.
5 Regarding the differences between a moral norm and other kinds of norms, see 
e.g.: M. O s s o w s k a: Podstawy nauki o moralnoœci. Warszawa, 1947, pp. 251—277; 
H. J a n k o w s k i: “Przedmiot etyki — moralnoœć.” In: Etyka. Ed. H. J a n k o w s k i. War-
szawa, 1975, pp. 65—120.
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become a directive aimed at all of the members of a group who 
would be obliged to observe it by the very fact of their affiliation 
to a given group (in a wider sense, one can treat a norm as a di-
rective, the fulfiling of which is the duty of everyone to whom this 
directive applies), whereas norms that do not include such obliga-
tion and commonness would be combined with the possibly “added” 
laudability of a deed. 
Typology of moral norms
Two basic ways of classifying moral norms should be mentioned: 
formal and content-wise ones. The first approaches norms through 
their “exterior” characteristics: the way they are formulated, the 
attitude to other elements of moral system, etc. The second one, in 
contrast, refers to the content of an order or prohibition that has 
been formulated in a norm. In this way, we can approach those 
spheres that are regulated by a moral norm and divide the whole 
of such directives into norms with the meaning presented above 
and directives of the nature of supererogational or guidelines for 
improvement.
Tadeusz Czeżowski, for example, classifies moral norms in a more 
formal way. He distinguishes two fundamental types of norms: tele-
ological and formal ones.6 The first type is related to an evaluation of 
something that constitutes some good. Czeżowski calls these norms 
axiological ones because they constitute an obligation by referring 
to some good, which is contrast to the second type. Czeżowski calls 
second type of norms deontic ones because we can only realise moral 
good by acting in accordance with a duty. Therefore, in the case of 
formal norms (deontic ones), the category of obligation is primary 
and only on its basis is it possible to define moral good. In the case 
of teleological (axiological), norms it is quite the opposite. 
6 T. C z e ż o w s k i: Aksjologiczne i deontyczne normy moralne. In: I d e m: Pisma z etyki 
i teorii wartoœci. Ed. P.J. S m o c z y ń s k i. Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków—Gdańsk—Łódź, 
1989, pp. 150—151.
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Formal norms are distinguished by Czeżowski according to the 
criteria of the group, the rights of which are of a crucial nature. He 
pinpoints egalitarianistic, elitist (among them individual or group 
norms) and norms that give primacy to the rights of others (though, 
as he remarks, this is only a theoretical possibility).7 
A slightly different classification of norms is offered by Czesław 
Znamierowski.8 He specifies three basic categories. Indicative norms 
belong to the first category and they indicate what is to be done in 
a given situation. Constructive norms belong to the second one and 
they define how something is to be done. And finally, competence 
norms that indicate the competence to evaluate the application of 
a given norm belong to the third one. 
It seems, however, that such formal classifications, although 
undoubtedly valuable from a theoretical point of view, are of little 
use in approaching the issues that are the subject of this paper. 
Hence, I will discuss them only superficially and I turn to content 
classification that suits my aim better. 
Czesław Znamierowski, when discussing moral norms, pays at-
tention to the following types: norms of direct relation, norms of 
indirect relation, rules of restraint, norms of moral technique and 
norms of individual excellence.9 Norms of direct relation “regulate 
direct the emotional relation and behavior of a human towards 
another human.”10 The norms of indirect relation, called also by 
Znamierowski “norms of the world’s tightness,” result from the 
limited resources of goods that are desired by man and from the 
limited possibilities to satisfy his needs. They comprise such rules 
as the commandments in the Bible such as “you shall not steal” 
or “you shall not covet your neighbour’s wife nor anything that is 
your neighbour’s.” The third group of norms, which are similar to 
some extent to the previous group, are the rules of restraint. They 
also result from “the world’s tightness” but they influence the moral 
subject more than his relations with other people. They regulate 
  7 Ibid.
  8 C. Z n a m i e r o w s k i: Oceny…, pp. 501—508.
  9 Ibid., pp. 406—409.
10 Ibid., pp. 406—409.
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his attitude towards the world, while the norms of indirect relation 
belong, in accordance with the concept of the author, to the area of 
human relationships and are exterior to the subject. 
The fourth group, according to Znamierowski’s classification, 
consists of norms of moral technique. The directives in this group 
deal with the practice of mutual kindness, which constitutes the 
basic guideline, “the morality norm,” that was mentioned above. It 
seems that this kind of directives belongs to the sphere of ideals 
rather than to the norms that are offered in the strict sense here. 
The norms of moral technique are the ways in which an agent re-
alises a mode of practicing such a way of life that brings maximum 
happiness to others. To fulfil these guidelines is, in a way, the first 
step towards individual excellence, which itself is organised by 
the norms of individual excellence. Znamierowski defines them as 
secondary as they have their source in the aims that “would have 
a place also in isolated consciousness.”11 The norms of internal ex-
cellence are independent of the environment in which a certain 
moral subject acts. However, they usually win the approval of the 
group when they bring some profit.
Such a classification of norms does not divide norms in the strict 
sense and ideals, yet it pays attention to some of the duality of 
directives seen along such lines. A full distinction between these 
two types of directives, also in terms of terminology, was offered 
by Maria Ossowska in her work Moral Norms.12 Her classification 
is stricte content-wise, as it is based on the classification of the 
subject of norms. Ossowska distinguishes successively: norms that 
protect our biological existence, our dignity, independence, privacy; 
norms that serve the need for trust, protecting justice, regulating 
social conflicts and those concerning the norms themselves. As 
a separate, terminologically distinguished, category of directives 
she points at virtues which she divides into soft virtues, those that 
guard peaceful coexistence (which are in fact a kind of development 
11 Ibid., p. 409.
12 M. O s s o w s k a: Moral Norms: A Tentative Systemization. Trans. I. G u ł o w s k a. 
Warszawa: PWN — Polish Scientific Publishers, 1980. For a rich and detailed description of 
the characteristics of the different types of norms see also her Podstawy…
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of norms dealing with social conflicts) and virtues that deal with 
the organisation of group life, personal virtues (decorative ones) 
and practical virtues.
Such a classification of moral directives shows their two-fold 
character, which is additionally underlined by terminological dis-
tinctions. It is clear that some common elements such as the ques-
tion of human dignity or directives that serve to harmonise human 
coexistence might also be pointed out; however, basically, the dis-
tinctiveness of norms and virtues seems to be clear. When analys-
ing norms concerning human dignity, Ossowska remarks that they 
somehow have a dual character, e.g., in the directive “Have dignity 
and respect others” a recommendation to possess one’s own dig-
nity is intertwined with the duty to respect that of others.13 Thus, 
virtues (as directives) are in a sense norms; however, they do not 
have such a restrictive character; they are pieces of advice rather 
than orders. A moral sanction, in their case (when not fulfilled), is 
much weaker or there is none at all.
Moral sanctions
Henryk Jankowski describes a moral sanction as a reaction of 
a group evoked by exceeding the norms.14 It seems, also in the 
popular way of moral thinking, that such a point of view finds in-
tuitional approval. In the meaning of this term offered here, the is-
sue of moral sanction might be considered as one of distinguishing 
marks of a norm. As I shall argue below, one may talk about some 
kind of moral sanction in the case of directives of an improving 
and supererogating character. However, a moral sanction of sensu 
stricto is most often combined with not fulfiling a duty, which cor-
responds with the formulation of a moral norm here. 
It seems that, basically, the forms of sanction can be divided 
into internal and external sanctions. Jankowski also offers an-
13 M. O s s o w s k a: Moral…p. 64.
14 H. J a n k o w s k i: “Przedmiot…,” p. 10.
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other type of division: factual sanctions and imagined sanctions. 
Such a division seems to appeal to the structures of mental life, 
to the results of the socialisation process, inculcation into a de-
scribed way of thinking in individuals with its frames.15 What is 
more — we can notice that such a typology of sanctions anticipates 
some settlements concerning the problem of moral obligation. One 
may say that an imagined form of sanction (mainly related — as 
it seems — to some properties of mental life) will be characteristic 
of a weaker type of obligation, and proper to supererogating and 
perfectionist directives.
In characterising the external forms of sanction, Jankowski indi-
cates its four stages:
1) submitting someone’s behaviour to a negative assessment (the 
most lenient);
2) depriving an individual of the rights he is entitled to because 
he belongs to a given group;
3) the group totally ignoring an individual;
4) exclusion from a group.16 
Some concurrence with a legal sanction (particularly seen in the 
last point) is noticeable in this classification. Such a concurrence 
may, to some extent, obliterate the differences between these two 
areas. It seems that Jankowski’s classification does not take into 
account the diversity in the types of societies because while in so-
called pre-modern society banishing might be considered as part 
of morality, in a modern society this issue falls under the law. Of 
course, one may protect the presented classification, pointing at 
a specific moral understanding of the exclusion from a group by 
a refusal to cooperate with a given individual, breaking contact 
with him/her, etc. However, it seems that the type of society, its 
structure and internal mechanisms are determining factors in the 
forms and uses of the external moral sanction.  
Internal sanctions, as it seems, are mainly connected with the 
results of the socialising process and are manifested first of all in 
15 For more on the forms of experiencing a moral sanction, see M. O s s o w s k a: Motywy 
postępowania. Z zagadnień psychologii moralnoœci. Warszawa, 1959, pp. 282—304.
16 H. J a n k o w s k i: “Przedmiot…,” p. 14.
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the form of remorse.17 Ossowska refers to McDougall’s definition, 
according to which: “Remorse is an emotion which has been com-
monly regarded by moralists as the most intense of the effects pro-
duced by the activity of that peculiar entity “the conscience.” It is 
a complex emotional state implying the existence of a well devel-
oped self-regarding sentiment and, generally, of moral sentiments. 
It arises upon the recollection of some past action that one deeply 
regrets; […].”18 
Ossowska indicates: anger (directed to the agent himself) and 
shame or fear (of punishment or humiliation) as the elements of 
remorse.19 However, she focuses on the fact that for the proper 
functioning of internal moral sanctions, the proper functioning of 
some general mental property, called “moral sense,” is indispen-
sable.20 Thus, a system of moral authority appears to be not only 
some acquired set of features and patterns of mental processes but 
also a property that belongs to the nature of man and is also inde-
pendent (at least partially) of him.
A moral sanction would therefore be a dual reaction for break-
ing the moral rules that are obligatory in a given society. Firstly, 
the mental mechanisms of estimation, which are developed during 
the socialisation process and that are acquired by an agent, would 
claim to speak (because this is only a general property, this “moral 
sense” is an instance that is independent of individual’s conscious-
ness). These mechanisms would incline an individual to compensate 
for doing wrong or to change their behaviour. Secondly, the moral 
mechanisms inside the group would be heard and they would aim 
at stigmatising a group member who has committed an offence and 
in the case of a lack of reaction — putting pressure on him that 
either forces the expected reaction or that limits the possibilities 
for his acting. 
17 For a discussion about the different concepts of the origin of remorse see e.g., 
M. O s s o w s k a: Motywy…, pp. 261—273.
18 W. M c D o u g a l l: Introduction to Social Psychology. 22 ed., p. 158; quoted after 
M. O s s o w s k a: Motywy…, p. 273.
19 M. O s s o w s k a: Motywy…, pp. 274—280.
20 Ibid., pp. 246—258.
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Social character of moral norms
The definition of moral norms, understood as the order of some 
conduct (or restraining from acting), may be comprehended in two 
ways: as a way of making some purpose of life real or as regula-
tive orders within a group. It seems that the first idea is, first of 
all, characteristic of theonomic ethics (as well as Ancient ethics). 
The second one is more general because the realisation of teleologi-
cal religious ethics is also fulfiled by a certain way of life. There-
fore, moral norms seem to fulfil mainly a social function, which is 
regulative in relation to human behaviour within a group (and in 
the contact of this group’s members with representatives of other 
communities, and in some cases also in relations among different 
groups).
Some authors indicate the necessity of such a localization of man 
in the system of norms (that is de facto in the system of connec-
tions and relationships that create a group) that enables him/her 
to be provided with not only security but also with the possibility 
to realise his potentiality. Podsiad, who was already quoted, also 
gives as one of the meanings of the term “norm” its psychologi-
cal meaning: “Quality and quantity level of different mental fea-
tures, for example intelligence, emotionality, activity which: a) is 
contained within the limits around the state most often found in 
a given population (conditioned by cultural and social factors), b) 
is of positive use of development of a certain individual in his crea­
tive adaptation to the environment.”21 It seems that moral norms, 
just like the psychological ones in the meaning quoted, serve not 
only as a protection of an individual’s being and the possibility of 
group survival but that they are also to support the realisation of 
the potentialities that are dormant in an individual and provide him 
with the possibility for their realisation. The norms mentioned by 
Ossowska that protect human dignity belong to such norms — for 
securing the feeling of one’s dignity and values is one of the basic 
conditions that enable free expression.
21 A. P o d s i a d: Słownik…, p. 571. emphasis mine — P.M.
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Thus, norms should be understood as directives that aim to pro-
tect the basic rights that an individual in a community is entitled 
to, while these rights should be understood quite widely (depending 
on the type of community they concern). Richard Brandt uses the 
notion of “moral pattern” to indicate “guideposts” that are to help 
us make a choice.22 They strengthen the kind of behaviour that is 
accepted in a given society, owing to which they eliminate the need 
to decide on every case individually. A “moral pattern” would be 
a kind of criterion of behaviour, in reference to which an individual 
should make his choices (and although the etymological notion of 
“norm” refers to a device serving as an indicator of a measure, one 
can get the sense that Brandt freely mixes the field of norms with 
the field of moral ideals, which also constitutes a kind of a model).
Jan Grad perceives an element of culture that is typical to 
a given community in a moral system as the one that cannot be 
considered in isolation from this culture.23 Moral norms that mem-
bers of a given community follow are rooted in the conditions of the 
life of a community and cannot be — as an element of its adapta-
tion to given conditions but also as an element of social practice 
— treated as something that comes from the outside.24
22 R. B r a n d t: Ethical Theory…, p. 155.
23 J. G r a d: Obyczaj a moralnoœć. Próba metodologicznego uporządkowania badań dotych­
czasowych. Poznań, 1993, pp. 119—121.
24 See ibid., pp. 143—144: “In our functional approach a determining order concerning 
morality is presented as follows: (1) social ‘material’ practice (of production, exchange, con-
sumption) creates objective demands for such kind of moral convictions which in an effective 
way could regulate it subjectively in the range of human relationships formulating within its 
frames […]; (2) demand for a definite kind of moral convictions formulates itself not only in 
the range of ‘material’ practice but they are revealed also by e.g. custom practice which con-
sists in communicating (demonstrating) positive attitude to definite outlook values, first of 
all moral ones and communicating memberships to definite social groups, but functions […] 
in socially differentiating and integrating mode; (3) these and other (formulating themselves 
in other spheres of social practice) demands are directed to ideologically creative cultural 
practice which ‘react’ with creation and approving respecting of suitable ideological messages 
building ideological systems and remaining ‘inside’ of these latest moral systems. Particu-
larly intensive ‘emphasis’ of functional demands on formulating suitable moral values causes 
general acceptance (respecting) of ideological messages implying moral norms of ‘desired’ 
kind or ‘adjusting’ of the existing messages to demanded task.” T. Czeżowski perceives this 
issue in a similar way believing that when any assessments or norms refer to primary unit 
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A definition of a moral norm can now be formulated:
A moral norm is a directive demanding or forbidding some action 
that is directed to all agents who meet certain formal conditions 
(e.g. membership of certain community), which defines their com-
mitment in terms of duty and (in the event of not fulfiling this 
duty) refers to a moral sanction. Such a norm regulates the behav-
iour of group’s members towards other members or a third party, 
and at the same time (in the sense of reflexive relation) protects 
the basic rights and capabilities of the agent. 
Moral ideal
To fulfil a directive expressed in a moral norm it is not necessary, 
of course, to perform everything that can be done in a certain situ-
ation. Nor is it to act according to the highest standards possible. 
It is rather fulfiling some minimum that guarantees the survival 
of an individual as well as the group and also — as has been men-
tioned — securing the basic rights of an agent. When we go beyond 
this minimum, we enter the area of laudable deeds, which are of 
special importance and are specially estimated. 
Two basic kinds of laudable deeds can be mentioned here: su-
pererogational deeds (that is sensu stricto laudable) and perfection-
ist deeds, which aim at reaching the completeness (perfection) of 
some feature or, in a wider sense, to realise the ideal. Taking into 
account these two categories of deeds, which should not be confused 
with each other, I am more interested in deeds that are connected 
with the pursuit of a kind of ideal rather than supererogational 
deeds; however, the latter category will also be helpful in the con-
ducted analysis. 
assessments, they are their hypostases and so — implicite — originate from moral praxis 
(T. C z e ż o w s k i: Dwojakie normy. In: I d e m: Pisma…, p. 147).
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The notion of the ideal
As Tadeusz Kotarbiński says: “The main regulator of all our daily 
matters, common lifestyle, is not enough for us sometimes: we are 
bored with it or it gets broken or is no longer suitable for changing 
circumstances or at last leaves without decision the issues which go 
beyond its range. Then the problem of conscious self-directing ap-
pears. We start to look for the rules which would unite a commune 
of unruly outbursts into a disciplined pack; we are looking for the 
primary idea of our life’s organization. In this way the systems of 
ethics of life wisdom are born.”25 
A similar idea is expressed by Tadeusz Czeżowski in his article 
Sens i wartoœć życia where he writes that our life has meaning if 
the activities that our life consists of create an ordered integrity.26 
Such meaning appears along with submitting one’s life to a “system 
of harmonised aims”27 crowned by the final aim of a life to which 
all smaller aims are submitted. We determine such an aim for our-
selves by choosing a “reasonable” ideal to aim at.28
Both Kotarbiński and Czeżowski seem to understand the moral 
ideal as a kind of idea or image that organises our activity and de-
scribes the way a choice is made. Without this external (because it 
does not come from the obligation of a norm) directive, our moral 
choices (and also norms) would in fact be a form of unwritten law. 
For it seems that one of the elements that differentiates a legal code 
from morality is the existence of some higher moral instance. This 
instance sanctions a definite hierarchy of goods that are guarded by 
norms. If we reject this instance, we will bring morality and ethics 
25 T. K o t a r b i ń s k i: Ideały. In: I d e m: Drogi dociekań własnych. Warszawa, 1986, 
p. 343.
26 T. C z e ż o w s k i: Sens i wartoœć życia (1). In: I d e m: Pisma…, p. 176.
27 Ibid.
28 Elswhere (Sens i wartoœć życia (2). In: I d e m: Pisma…, p. 183) Czeżowski points out 
that understanding the meaning of life as the pursuit of happiness — as so often happens 
in common thinking — is false because happiness is not an immanent feature of reality, the 
status quo, but a phenomenon that accompanies the reaching of some goods. Therefore, the 
real sense of life lies in — or rather it should — aiming at some goods, the reaching of which 
will evoke a feeling of happiness. This seems to be an essential argument in favour of the 
teleological vision of morality.
140 Ethics, anthropology, aesthetics
exclusively into the sphere of norms and later to their regulative 
functions with respect to social behaviour. Here, legal norms must 
appear to be more effective — as they are subject to codification 
and operate with more severe sanctions. Thus, the ideal determines 
the aim that we should follow and norms would be the first “de-
terminant” in this process (in accordance with their etymology).29
That is why, for example, Max Scheler unambiguously empha-
sised the meaning of the “theory of models,” which according to him 
constitutes the starting point for the possibility of evaluating judge-
ments.30 It seems that the way of defining the content of moral norms 
in a given community, if they are to differ from moral norms, should 
assume some superior idea, a vision of the good or universal order 
which is introduced in the sphere of practice through the system of 
norms. Therefore, ideals are usually bound to either the unconscious 
heart of the culture of a given community or with its religious roots.31 
Pałubicki defines the ideal in the following way: “Ideal — some-
thing or features, attributes of someone or something which satisfy 
requirements of the man, which were considered as expression of 
some perfection and to which the man aspires.”32
A similar definition is offered by Podsiad: “Ideal: […] 1. This 
is what to a highest extent might satisfy man’s requirements and 
therefore becomes the object of his aspirations.
2. The model of perfection in a definite area of thoughts or 
activity.”33
29 It seems that part of modern “open” societies is a tendency to reduce the sphere of 
morality to legal contracts and financial dependencies. In these societies — for example in 
the US — the processes of the atomisation and disintegration of traditional moral systems 
(as restricted only to a narrow group of people and as being an obstacle to an unfettered mix-
ing of people and cultures) will lead to a situation in which conflicts might only be decided by 
appealing to a legal authority. This is the source of those trials that seem in the least strange 
to observers from other cultures.
30 M. S c h e l e r: Wzory i przywódcy. In: I d e m: Pisma wybrane z filozofii religii. Trans. 
G. S o w i ń s k i. Kraków, 2004, [English edition: M. S c h e l e r: Exemplars of Persons and 
Leaders. In: I d e m: Persons and Self­Value: Three Essays, Dordrecht—Boston—Lancaster, 
1987, pp. 127—198].
31 See ibid., pp. 214, 227. Also see Ł. T r z c i ń s k i: Mit bohaterski w perspektywie 
antropologii filozoficznej i kulturowej. Kraków, 2006.
32 W. P a ł u b i c k i: Antropologia­filozofia­etyka…, p. 157.
33 A. P o d s i a d: Słownik…, column 363 (the same definition in Mały słownik…).
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In both of these definitions, the ideal is understood as fulfilment 
(in the meaning of the complete realisation of the essence) of a given 
feature, virtue or duty (for example — as it was in the concept of 
Aristotle — resulting from the very fact of being a human). At the 
same time, it points out the direction towards which human activ-
ity should aim. The ideal perfectly defines the fulfilment of a deed 
and represents an “objective” view of a given duty, while a norm, as 
an ascertainment of imperfect human nature, would point at some 
minimum, the fulfilment of which would be required to fall within 
the category of being moral (in an evaluative sense).
As Brandt remarked,34 there is still no research concerning the 
creation of ideals35 (or more widely, “ethical models” — to use the 
notion that is employed by this author). However, he states that 
their history in Europe precedes the history of writing. One can 
risk a statement that the process of the creation of ideals was si-
multaneous with creation of the very ideal morality itself.36 
Władysław Tatarkiewicz finds the etymology of the Polish (as 
well as English) notion of “perfection” in the Latin word perfectio, 
which derives from perficio — “to accomplish,” “to bring to an end.”37 
However, he underlines the fact that the origin of this notion is 
both Latin and Greek. In Ancient Greece this notion was mainly 
used for concrete referents, which results in the term teliotes being 
translated as “absoluteness” (for example by the Polish translator 
of Nicomachean Ethics — Daniela Gromska).38
Among the definitions enumerated by Tatarkiewicz, two of them 
seem to be especially important: “2. What f u l f i l s  all f u n c t i o n s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f o r  i t s e l f  is perfect. […] 3. What has reached 
its aim is perfect.”39
It seems that the notion of the moral ideal was usually connected 
with some vision of human nature and that this nature was mostly 
34 R. B r a n d t: Ethical Theory…, p. 156.
35 One such theory comes from M. S c h e l e r, see Wzory i przywódcy…, p. 283.
36 See Ł. T r z c i ń s k i: Mit…, pp. 9—26.
37 W. T a t a r k i e w i c z: O doskonałoœci. Wybrane eseje. Lublin, 1991, p. 9.
38 Ibid., pp. 10—11.
39 Ibid., pp. 14—15.
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perceived as a kind of project that should be realised by a man dur-
ing his life. And, although the definition of the “starting” nature 
of man as well as the aim of his development have had a different 
approach in particular centuries,40 some elements were constant in 
this teleological pattern. Firstly, the very term “man” was used in 
a rather more postulative than descriptive way. The ancient un-
derstanding of man as an “animal rationale,” which comes from 
Philolaus, signifies not a statement of a fact but rather a recipe.41 
This recipe was given the shape of an ideal that should be followed 
by a concrete man and the realisation of which he should aim at. 
Owing to this, human life was given a purpose and meaning. Thus, 
the notion of an ideal, defined in this way, is first of all related to 
teleological ethics.
The ideal and the model of behaviour
The form of representing moral ideals that are used most often are 
the role models that are embodied in certain characters. Jankowski 
notes that such personal models represent the evaluations and 
norms that are characteristic of a given moral system. They may, 
as Jankowski says, represent both a specific norm as well as consti-
tute a representation of the whole system.42 The most characteristic 
examples of these two types of representation might be found in the 
Bible. The Good Samaritan embodies only one feature, while Jesus 
embodies the entire system of New Testament morality.
Ossowska questions the usability of the term “ideal” and pos-
tulates replacing it with the term “the model of behaviour.”43 This 
explorer defines a personal model as a human character that is the 
object of the aspirations of certain people or groups. Such a model 
40 See M. O s s o w s k a: Podstawy…, pp. 350—351. On the history of the notion of perfec-
tion and its changes, see e.g. W. T a t a r k i e w i c z: O doskonałoœci…, pp. 31—46.
41 See J. G a j d a: Pitagorejczycy. Warszawa, 1996. 
42 H. J a n k o w s k i: Przedmiot…, p. 13.
43 M. O s s o w s k a: Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany. Warszawa, 2000, pp. 10—11.
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indicates the kind (or kinds) of personality that is particularly 
valuable or that receives special recognition in a given culture. In 
this sense, as Ossowska remarks, personal models are the keys to 
understanding a given culture.44
A precise definition of a personal model is given by Barbara Mej-
baum:
In the meaning of a personal model distinguished here, it will al-
ways be about some wholeness, arrangement, system, structure 
of elements which might be articulated at least in three ways:
a) as disposable features or behaviour of a historical or fictitious 
person (Hercules, Doctor Judym, Franklin, Christ) in different 
situations, where both the system of features of a person as well 
as situations will be a description of conceptualization character;
b) as a system of human features given as a set of virtues, a se-
lected set of needs or attitudes, not referred to a concrete person 
(saint, knight, decent man);
c) as a set of norms describing human behaviour in different situ-
ations (casuistry). Connection of definite systems of norms with 
sets of features and situations of a personal model seems possi-
ble to follow (logical, psychological and axiological connection).45
The model, embodied in a vision of life, functions as a leading 
idea that somehow allows one’s life to be organised and to give it 
some meaning. Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue pays attention 
to the importance of “narrative unity of life,” which is presented 
in the form of a story that enables the subject to identify a moral 
obligation.46 A narrative representation of life gives the representa-
tives of a given culture the image of life that is adequate for them 
(whereby according to this author, along with the change of an ep-
och and progressive cultural changes, the literary form in which 
this unity is expressed changes as well). The heroes of stories that 
44 M. O s s o w s k a: Wzór demokraty. Lublin, 1992, p. 9.
45 B. M e j b a u m: “Kategoria wzoru osobowego. Szkic metodologiczny.” In: Wartoœci 
a sposób życia. Materiały Ogólnopolskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego. Ed. M. M i c h a l i k. 
Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków—Gdańsk, 1979, p. 127.
46 A. M a c I n t y r e: After Virtue. A study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. Notre Dame Univer-
sity Press, 1984. Polish translation by A. C h m i e l e w s k i: A. M a c I n t y r e: Dziedzictwo 
cnoty: studium z teorii moralnoœci. Warszawa, 1996.
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are understood in this way become the embodiment of the basic 
moral postulates of a given culture and play an essential role in 
the moral upbringing of its representatives. 
The model of behaviour is therefore not only a signpost that is 
useful in making moral choices and defining the ideals that give 
meaning to life. It is also a tool of child rearing and an element of 
the socialisation process. Imitation of a given ideal allows one’s sub-
jectivity to be defined and quite often one’s position in a group as 
well. For if we consider, for example, the medieval model of knight, 
one can prove that it not only serves as the self-definition of a given 
social group (and particular individuals in its frames) but it also 
suggests to other members of the group the proper attitude on the 
part of community that is distinguished by this model (it also de-
fines the expectations of the group in relation to this part).47
Typology of ideals
Constructing the typology of ideals is a much more complicated ac-
tivity than performing the analogous procedure for moral norms. 
Firstly, every culture and every society creates their own typology 
that is characteristic for them with their own personal models and 
ideals, and secondly, it would be difficult to point at the criteria, 
according to which such a classification could be performed. 
It seems that it is impossible to create a formal classification 
of ideals. It is possible to distinguish some types of perfection that 
are characteristic of particular “norms of morality” (in the sense of 
Biesaga); however, a formal classification of ideals as such is con-
fronted by various obstacles. The only solution appears to be the 
distinction of models that was offered by Jankowski, which depict 
the whole of a given moral system (which as a consequence can be 
called complex models) and single values (which can be called frag-
mentary models). This distinction enables the superiority of some 
47 On imitating, see M. O s s o w s k a: Ethos…, pp. 16—21.
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models to be defined in relation to others, though the very way in 
which definite ideals emerge and what their meanings are still re-
mains unclear here. 
The solution to this problem and to some degree a guideline to 
a possible content classification of ideals is given by Max Scheler 
in the quoted work. He claims that classification of a “model of pat-
terns” should be connected with the basic values that define hu-
man ways of acting. Identifying these basic ideas with hedonistic, 
civilisation, vital, cultural and religious values, he distinguishes 
five corresponding types of models: the artist of life, the leading 
spirit of civilisation, the hero, the genius and the saint.48 Models 
understood in this way should therefore be treated in accordance 
with the concept of Tatarkiewicz as a complement or realisation of 
these basic values. However, what seems to be particularly impor-
tant here is their function as underlined by Scheler, which consists 
in suggesting the direction for the realisation of given norms. The 
fulfilment reached by the values in mythic characters is a point of 
reference for everyone who is engaged in the realisation of a par-
ticular value. Therefore, consciously or not, the evaluation of such 
an activity of the engaged subject always happens in relation to the 
model, the ideal, and not to the norm that is accepted in a given 
social and cultural context.
Thus, if we are to assume the optics that were offered by a Ger-
man philosopher, one should accept that to become acquainted with 
the ethos of a given culture or community one should identify not 
the set of norms that are followed by its members but their set of 
models, which are personified in its proper community of culture 
and religion, and which point to the basic directions for channel-
ling their activities.
48 M. S c h e l e r: Wzory i przywódcy…, p. 216.
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Supererogation
The origin of the problem and the Christian concept  
of supererogation
A separate category that describes a particular kind of morally 
laudable acts is supererogation. It seems that in a sense this is 
a category that locates a given deed between a norm and the ideal. 
Although the author of the only treatise on this topic in Polish lit-
erature, Andrzej Maciej Kaniowski,49 seems to combine superero-
gation acts with the realisation of some vision of a moral ideal, 
this is — as I shall argue — false reasoning. The connection of the 
categories of laudability and voluntariness that is used to describe 
a supererogation act by Kaniowski, on the one hand, shows the 
independence of the sanction that corresponds with the obligatory 
moral norm and, on the other hand, shows that they do not have 
to mean the realisation of the ideal at all, since it is only a volun-
tary act that is considered in terms of laudability. I will discuss 
this issue in the last section of this paper. Let me start, however, 
with presentation of the characteristics of supererogation itself.
Kaniowski found the origin of the term “supererogation” in the 
Bible,50 more specifically in the parable of the Good Samaritan: “[…] 
he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper: ‘Look after 
him,’ he said, ‘and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra 
expense you may have [quodcumque supererogavieris — A.M.K.]’.”51
The original meaning of the term supererogare means, as Kanio-
wski states, “paying more than amount due.”52 Moral Catholic theo-
49 A.M. K a n i o w s k i: Supererogacja. Zagubiony wymiar etyki. Warszawa, 1999.
50 I mean the origin of the notion “supererogation” and not the problem of deeds surpass-
ing a generally known duty. For this deed, which is pointed out by Kaniowski, is the object of 
earlier considerations. See ibid., pp. 26—27. When talking about the origin, Kaniowski means 
the appearance of the problem in modern concepts rather than the origin in the strict sense.
51 Luke 10, 35. The New Holy Bible, New International Version.
52 A.M. K a n i o w s k i: Supererogacja…, p. 25.
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logians53 considered the parable itself not to be an interpretation 
of the doctrine of supererogation but as an example of it because it 
lacks the elements that determine the laudable, voluntary charac-
ter of supererogation deeds since in Catholicism54 supererogation is 
defined as follows: “Supererogation, Works of — Virtuous acts sur-
passing what is required by duty or obligation. They are compared to 
other works not as good to evil, but as better works to good works.”55
The Christian doctrine of laudable acts is based on the funda-
mental distinction between “duties” and “pieces of advice.” “Duties” 
are the obligations that are expressed mainly in the Decalogue, 
which create a kind of basic law that should be respected by every 
Christian in order to deserve the salvation, or those that fall under 
a moral category in general (the term “moral” is, in this case — as 
one might presume — used in an evaluative aspect, not a descrip-
tive one). Pieces of advice do not result from an obligation; they are 
rather an additional, “extra” fulfillment of God’s commandments, 
which are aimed at creating of a kind of “surplus” of grace in rela-
tion to that which will be given to the faithful who are “ordinary.” 
Therefore, a supererogational act is, in fact, according to Kanio-
wski’s interpretation, an equivalent of a virtuous act. Considering 
the relation between a virtue and law, the author notes that the 
unequivocal separation of these two categories is in no way obvious. 
For, if by virtue of the law of nature every creature should follow 
in relation to their proper form, man should absolutely submit his 
life to the requirements of the mind. Then, on reaching perfection, 
which can be gained owing to virtuous acts, he should be consid-
ered as a subject to obligation. In this sense supererogational acts 
would be de facto identical with activities that are prescribed by 
obligation. However — as Kaniowski remarks — this is only one 
point of view. As he says: “From the point of view of virtue and 
53 Catholicism was the belief system in western Christianity in which the concept of super-
erogation was able to appear; Protestantism, due to to some doctrinal differences, does not 
admit the possibility of the existence of a deed that goes beyond a duty. See ibid., pp. 55—67.
54 As a kind of convenience and bearing in mind the remarks made in the previous foot-
note, I will use the terms “Christianity” and “Catholicism” interchangeably.
55 J. H e n n e s s y: “Supererogation, Works of.” In: New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 13. 
New York, 1967, p. 810. See A.M. K a n i o w s k i: Supererogacja…, p. 21.
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aspiration for perfection fulfilling virtuous acts must be seen as 
something consistent with nature and therefore it should be re-
garded as required by natural moral law. However, as the man is 
not a perfect creature, and this is the other point of view, for he 
is not the creature purely rational, there might exist virtuous acts 
which fulfillment cannot be required by natural moral law, nor by 
the law of God. What is more, it relates to a positive human law, 
which, at its most can demand fulfillment of some virtuous acts, 
namely those which relate directly or indirectly to the common good 
understood as justice and peace.”56
The possibility of defending the concept of supererogation (at 
least in the frames of the outlined concept) is connected with estab-
lishing a kind of hierarchy of moral dignity that is achieved with 
regard to the level of perfection. Otherwise, supererogational acts 
would have no sense.
Secular concept of supererogation
Andrzej Kaniowski, when considering the problem of supererogation 
from the point of view of modern deontic theories, points out three 
classes of moral deeds that are recognised within them: ordered, 
forbidden and morally indifferent. Here, the basic question arises 
as to the border between a supererogation act and an obligatory 
act. Drawing such a demarcation line would allow, according to the 
mentioned author, the three-part classification to be transformed 
into a four-part classification that would also comprise superero-
gation acts. 
According to Kaniowski, such a border might be demarcated 
when we take the category of “common sense” as a criterion and 
consider the entirety of circumstances as a factor which might, in 
some situations, cause the cessation of a duty. This entirety results 
from the acceptance of this category (as a criterion of acting). This 
56 A.M. K a n i o w s k i: Supererogacja…, p. 51.
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“common sense” definition of the borders of a duty signifies taking 
into account all of those external elements that might cause that 
the fulfilment of a duty or a continuation of a sequence of actions 
that result from it to be a threat to the subject performing a given 
action or in a case in which the intended effect of an activity does 
not compensate the losses that are borne.57 Kaniowski states: “The 
entirety of circumstances of acting on which the attention of re-
searches is focused, appears to be the factor demarcating the bor-
ders of a duty. From this point of view supererogation is every act 
which is, firstly, morally good and secondly, with regard to the 
entirety of circumstances it deserves a praise and not fulfilling of 
this will not result in moral reprimand.”58
At the basis of the concept of supererogation outlined here, there 
is a kind of dualism of optics, which is the same as it was in the 
Christian concept by which the agent is expressed. For, on the one 
hand, he is defined as an imperfect individual, about which we know 
that it is impossible to dispose of its imperfection and the evil exist-
ing in the world. On the other hand, however, there is no consent 
for such a status quo.59 Such a disagreement, expressed in a super-
erogation act, takes on “moral significance,”60 takes up a challenge 
of carrying out of a duty (or fulfiling it in exceptionally unfavour-
able circumstances). As Kaniowski writes, the act “deserving to be 
praised” is defined by him in the category of laudability.61
We should stop at this praise that Kaniowski seems to under-
stand as something that surpasses the definition of “good.” There-
fore, the praise would be a way of expressing approval of a super-
erogation act. However, acceptance of its definition means setting 
aside the distinction “good — bad” and accepting a continuity in 
57 Ibid., p. 148. One should pay attention to the fact that such a definition of a duty is 
only one of the possible ones, for if circumstances, e.g., if there is a threat to the life of the 
subject who is obliged to perform a given duty, one may pose the question of whether these 
circumstances do not de facto abolish this duty. For it would be difficult to show the right in 
sustaining the status of a duty in a life-threatening situation.
58 Ibid., p. 149.
59 See ibid., p. 152.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. pp. 143—146 and 160—164.
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which these two terms would only be specific or characteristic el-
ements. Also, in colloquial language, according to Kaniowski, we 
make estimations with regard to different degrees of shading of 
which pictures, for example, the fact of stating on the laudability 
itself of a given deed (also in the sense of every day evaluations 
that are deprived of a theoretical basis). Therefore, approving the 
existence of a category of supererogation acts means consenting to 
considering the distinction “good-evil” as not being enough for a full 
description of moral acts.62 And this leads, as Kaniowski claims, to 
the necessity of defining of what constitutes, in fact, the object of 
moral assessment: the acting subject or the act itself.
Kaniowski pays attention to the fact that when considering a deed 
of moral acting, we can approach the task in two ways. Firstly, it 
may only be considered with regard to its external aspect, that is, — 
as the author mentioned says — “objectively.”63 In the second case, 
when assessing the act, one also takes into account at least some mo-
ments subjectively: intentions, reasons, etc.64 Secondly, Kaniowski 
writes, a moral subject may also be considered from two points of 
view: either with regard to such subjective moments or by emphasis-
ing its permanent dispositions: features of character, virtues etc.65 
In the assessment of a supererogation act — Kaniowski claims — 
we make an assessment of not only the act but also of the agent.66 
Only after considering all four aspects of a moral deed can we fully as-
sess such a deed. One should pay attention to the fact that this author 
seems to join not only the axiological and deontological dimensions 
of a given deed but also — as a result of introducing the category of 
laudability — that he somehow considers this deed in three aspects.67
Such an act, according to Kaniowski, cannot be described with 
the help of the duty category but only with the obligation category. 
A supererogation act, however, cannot be ordered (it would not be 
62 Ibid. pp. 154—156.
63 Ibid., p. 157.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 161.
67 Ibid., pp. 170—171.
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a supererogation deed) but at the most it can be recommended. Its 
undertaking, that is the undertaking of a duty resulting from this 
obligation, is attributed by the author to some natural disposition 
that is characteristic for a narrow group, which he calls, after Kant, 
“moral feeling.”68
Introducing the idea of “moral feeling” and replacing duty as 
the source of a supererogation act along with the obligation that it 
entails, according to Kaniowski, makes it necessary to reformulate 
the basic question. This necessity results from the problem of the 
approach to such obligation.
In classic moral concepts, the basic issue was the question: What 
should I do? Or: What should I be like?69 However, as Kaniowski re-
marks, such a formulation of a morality problem constitutes one of 
the main problems that are brought by grasping the essence of acts.70 
According to the author, formulating the question about the desired 
status quo is more accurate: “Which status quo should take place? or 
to be more precise: Which status quo should not take place?”71 Such 
a change in the morality object allows Kaniowski to formulate the idea 
of “ontological obligation,” whose origin might be observed in Kant.72 
This reformulating allows, according to the author, an “alleviation” of 
the moral subject, who, in this way, is given the freedom needed to de-
cide on the laudability of an act. At the same time, the duty to act in fa-
vour of the proper status quo is replaced with obligation that takes into 
account the conditions of acting and human weakness. Here, a two-
fold shape of supererogation appears: “One form of supererogation is 
based on the fact that agent undertakes realization of ontological obli-
gation, which does not have any specified addressee and thus, no one is 
forced to feel that, with his omission or acting, he is jointly responsible 
68 Ibid., pp. 162—165.
69 Ibid., p. 395.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., pp. 394—400 and 377—378. The breaking of an “egocentric point of view,” which 
Kaniowski wants to see as a traditional moral scheme seems to be only apparent. For, if we 
reformulate the basic question of morality in accordance with this author’s recommendation, 
we might ask the question about the foundation on which we will base our vision of the desired 
status quo and this, on the other hand, restores this egocentric status quo.
152 Ethics, anthropology, aesthetics
for arisen and negatively perceived status quo, which should not have 
taken place. In the case of second form of supererogation we deal with 
realisation by the subject of explicitly addressed duty towards him in 
the situation when some obstacles appear to fulfil it.”73
Supererogation defined in this way is, according to Kaniowski, 
a hybrid concept that because it is defined in a two-fold way — by re-
ferring to deontological imperatives on the one hand and the concrete 
conditions of acting on the other hand — cannot have the status of 
an autonomous category of the assessment of moral acts.74 
Between the norm and the ideal
Andrzej Kaniowski, by introducing the category of laudability into 
the description of supererogation acts, extends a typical deontic set 
of moral acts so that they now include four kinds: ordered deeds, for-
bidden deeds, indifferent deeds and recommended deeds (superero-
gational ones). However, it seems that the author does not take note 
of a kind of difference between two categories of deeds: supereroga-
tion deeds and deeds that surpass a duty but are directed towards 
the realisation of some kind of ideal (perfectioning).
Kaniowski, somehow following the Thomistic approach, consid-
ers a deed that surpasses a duty as convergent with the realisation 
of an ideal. For surpassing a duty, as he writes,75 both in religious 
ethics as well as in secular ethics, determines some levels of per-
fection, which are not possible to achieve without such a solution. 
One may presume that this convergence has its origin in the ac-
ceptance of a way of thinking that comes from religious ethics in 
which complete morality is basically connected with a defined life-
style, which thus assumes a general moral attitude. 
In this sense, the distinction between orders and pieces of advice 
and hence — the sphere of minimum and the sphere of maximum 
73 Ibid., p. 400.
74 Ibid., p. 385.
75 See ibid., p. 81.
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(sphere of the ideal) is, in fact, exclusively a calibration of a rec-
ommended moral type — even when remaining at only the level 
of norms, an individual realises some recommended ideal of life, 
functions — as Kaniowski calls this, thereby evoking the categories 
offered by J.O. Hannay76 — in the frames of lower Christian life, 
as opposed to higher Christian life, which signifies some greater 
moral effort. In Christian ethics, surpassing a duty is understood 
in the way that is appropriate for the interpretation of the fable of 
the rich young man that was presented earlier.
However, with regard to secular ethics, such a unification of su-
pererogation and the ideal is unjustified. When, for example, moving 
within the range of the classical moral scheme, an individual performs 
a deed with regard to his perfection, he realises the ideal at the same 
time. This is not identical with the realisation of a supererogation 
deed though. For one can point at deeds that do not serve for the im-
provement of an individual but are laudable deeds despite this (such 
an act, as it seems, might just be the realisation of an “ontological ob-
ligation,” that does not have any definite addressee and that does not 
result from mercy or any other form of directing “moral feeling” toward 
other individuals). And if this is so, one can introduce a fifth element 
into the classification of moral deeds that would consist of: ordered 
deeds (in a sense of some minimum, which would be required for fall-
ing within the category of being moral in a valorising sense), forbidden 
deeds, indifferent deeds, recommended deeds (supererogational ones) 
and perfectionist deeds (while this postulate is of a different power 
here and has a meaning other than recommendation; it is rather all 
about deeds the realisation of which is connected with the realisation 
of a form of ideal, for example, human nature understood as a project). 
Obviously, adding a fifth element to this classification is only possible 
when it is assumed that the aspiration for the realisation of an ideal 
(the fulfilment of human nature) is not obligatory, which might be 
disputable. Nevertheless, although Kaniowski pays a lot of attention 
to the question of demarcating a border between supererogation and 
duty, one should also define the difference between the understand-
76 Ibid., p. 69.
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ing of supererogation that is presented here and a moral ideal. And if 
my reasoning is correct, supererogation is situated between a norm 
understood as some minimum and an ideal.
Types of obligations connected with norms and ideals
A three-part classification of moral deeds in a normative sense re-
sults from considerations carried out here. At first, we deal with or-
dered deeds, obligatory ones. Fulfiling a deed that is prescribed with 
a norm that is understood as a criterion of being moral (in an evalua-
tive sense) constitutes, for a group, a signal for the possibility of “co-
operation” with a given individual, and it is a guarantee of respecting 
the rights that are indispensable for the existence of the group itself. 
As it seems, only the moral nature of man allows the proper function-
ing of a community. “Proper” would mean here: securing basic rights 
and allowing one’s own potentialities to be realized, and with Schel-
er’s interpretation added, it would also mean: in accordance with the 
fundamental dimension of human acting.
The realisation of a directive prescribed by a norm does not fulfil 
an ontological obligation though. Some theoreticians, for example, 
Moore, who represent non-naturalism, define a duty as a deed that 
brings more good to the universe than any other possible act in a given 
situation. Therefore, using quite a radical approach, one may think 
that only the fulfilment of an ontological obligation (understood as 
achieving the desired status quo) is the performance of a good deed. 
However, as Kaniowski stressed, one should pay attention to the 
limitation, the imperfection of human nature as not everyone is able 
to cope with such a widely understood duty. An attempt to maintain 
an ontological obligation as the only binding one would risk an accu-
sation of excessive rigour and breaking with realities of life. Maria 
Ossowska, following Moore’s distinction, distinguishes two mean-
ings of the notion of “ought,” and consequently, two types of norms. 
On the one hand, one may point at “rules of duty” and on the other 
hand — “ideal rules”: “In one case the man ‘should’ be such and such 
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or should behave in such and such way only when he can, the second 
‘should’ does not take this possibility into account at all.”77
It is symptomatic that Ossowska does not mention two different 
types of obligations but rather a kind of “grading” of obligation as 
such. With reference to Kaniowski, one can suggest an ontological 
obligation as the proper object of obligation, while a distinction norm 
— an ideal — would only be a description of these grades. A simi-
lar standpoint is presented by Richard Brandt. He pays attention 
to a kind of objectivity in defining a moral obligation, and at the 
same time states that this is the basis on which to talk about moral 
obligations with different levels of intensity. Even in the colloquial 
use of language, we often, according to the author, talk about dif-
ferent powers of duty. This, on the other hand, as Brandt writes, 
somehow constitutes a “double” instance of moral duty — we are 
obliged to do something when the sense of duty finds its objective 
justification and also when claiming that the attitude of others to-
wards us is objectively justified as well.78
Thus, we cannot talk about the kinds of obligations that are con-
nected with norms or ideals as about something different in an objec-
tive and substantial way. It is rather all about the amount of distinc-
tion, a gradation of power. In this view, there are not two different 
(objectively) kinds of moral sanctions that are connected with a dis-
tinction norm — the ideal. Only a deed that is performed within the 
power of a certain individual might be required and obligatory. Its 
omission is first of all connected with the external dimension of a sanc-
tion. In the case of the omission of a laudable deed, a moral sanction 
might only have an internal character (often imagined).
What is more, if we assume the view that is appropriate to the eth-
ics of virtues, the difference between the concept of a perfectionist 
deed and a supererogation deed becomes much clearer as it seems that 
concentration on the idea of ontological obligation, that is on a meta-
physical element, which is independent of the agent himself, intro-
duces some confusion in distinction between supererogation deeds 
77 M. O s s o w s k a: Podstawy…, p. 118.
78 R. B r a n d t: Ethical Theory…, pp. 602—603.
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and perfectionist deeds because in this case perfection would have 
to deal with some ideal status quo and the ways of reaching it would 
have to remain unknown. Contrary to this concentration on the sub-
ject, which is appropriate to the virtue ethics, directly leads to the 
idea of the perfection of a person and so consists of a vision of imper-
fection of the man, as well as an educational element, a description of 
the path on which man should travel, thus aiming at perfection (one 
might give reasons that Ancient ethics are practically to a large ex-
tent only descriptions of such a transformation). Only on this basis 
does the distinction that is offered become clear. Man, by performing 
a laudable deed, may follow either a perfectionist premise, a willing-
ness to keep highest standards that are preserved in the appropriate 
virtue of character (so an intention of preservation of this virtue) or an 
intention of an essential change in the status quo that is independent 
of main directions of his activity.79 
Conclusion: norms and ideals
The basic criterion that is used to separate ideals and norms is the 
function that they fulfil in a moral system (one should understand 
the term “moral system” not as an ordered set of sentences concern-
ing the morality that is appropriate to philosophical ethics, but all 
such sets and thus the entirety of norms, ideals and methods of evalu-
ation that are characteristic for a given community). Norms are im-
manent element of community life; they already appeared at the low-
est levels of the development of human culture and their basic task 
79 Obviously, these arguments may be questioned for it could be pointed out that by per-
forming such a supererogation deed, an agent shows a virtue of character. However, it seems 
that this feature is somehow mediated here and the virtue of character only constitutes the 
context of taking up an activity, whereas on the ground of the ethics of virtues, an activity, 
according to Aristotle’s approach, is just taken up with regard to the virtue. See A r i s t o -
t l e: Nicomachean ethics II, 4, 1105 a.
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is to regulate interpersonal relationships by defining obligatory and 
forbidden duties. Ideals constitute a kind of “superstructure” of the 
sphere of norms. Their task is to provide a model, a point of reference 
for norms and formulated assessments. Broadly speaking — they pro-
vide a model of the desired personal types and behaviour for a given 
community; they define the “character” of a community and (at least 
partially) its attitude towards other groups.
The second criterion that differentiates the sphere of norms from 
the sphere of ideals constitutes the range of their operation. While all 
group members are obliged to obey norms, the realisation of ideals is 
proper for elite, who will manage to rise above particularism on the 
one hand and on the other hand above the regulative character of the 
sphere of norms. At the same time, the elite define the direction at 
which the moral activity of other group members should aim. The hi-
erarchy of moral dignity has to, necessarily, be connected with some 
inequality in the status of particular individuals, for as it seems, some 
persuasive power results from the concept of elitism.
The element that is common for both norms and ideals is their 
complementary character within a moral system. For it appears that 
these categories are not only markers of some spectrum of obligations 
but also guidelines that concern the existence of the very fact that 
a moral obligation is different from an obligation that is burdened 
with a legal or moral sanction. Even if we treat the sphere of ideals 
as the superstructure of norms, one should note that this “added” 
character is connected with practical optics. In the meantime, if one 
considers the matter in accordance with Scheler’s attitude, the sphere 
of ideals, and therefore the “complements” of norms, appears to be 
source of the possibilities that define the content of norms. Otherwise, 
it would be necessary, as it seems, to assume that moral norms only 
have the character of convention. 
Therefore, the connection between sphere of norms and sphere of 
ideals (somehow mediated by supererogation deeds) determines, in 
fact, the possibility of the logical coherence of a moral system and 
the possibilities to refer it to a wider vision of man.
Translated by Ewa Woœ
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S u m m a r y
The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between basic moral categories, 
namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. I discuss, firstly, the ways of 
understanding these categories, secondly, how moral acting can be described using 
them and thirdly, how they relate within certain moral system. Yet, what is of a spe-
cial importance is the relation between norms and ideals and their complementary 
character. For it might be argued that omission of one of these categories may lead 
to posing important limitations on the possibilities of grasping certain moral issue 
adequately (on a descriptive level) and setting the full range of possible solutions (on 
normative level). Hence, I argue that to resign from two-level form of moral analysis 
may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself.
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Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g
Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist, die Wechselbeziehung zwischen den Grund-
kategorien der Moralpostulate: Normen, Idealen und Supererogationsempfehlungen 
zu untersuchen. Es wird untersucht: auf welche Weise werden diese Kategorien
verstanden, welche moralische Handlungen sind dank der Anwendung von diesen 
Kategorien möglich und wie sind die gegenseitigen Relationen zwischen den Kate-
gorien im Bereich des Moralsystems. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist aber die Rela-
tion zwischen den Normen und Idealen und die These von deren komplementären 
Charakter. Wenn man zwar im Bereich des Moralsystems eins von den untersuchten 
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Elementen auslässt, wird man sowohl bei adäquater Beurteilung eines bestimmten 
moralischen Problems (auf deskriptiver Ebene), wie auch bei Bestimmung eines vol-
len Spektrums von normativen Empfehlungen wesentlich begrenzt. Infolgedessen 
kann das Verzichten auf zweiflächige Weise der Untersuchung von moralischen 
Problemen sogar zur Atrophie der ethischen Idee selbst führen.
